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The Role of Regulators: Energy Efficiency
DAVID NICHOLS,

I.

PH.D.*

Introduction

This paper addresses policy and regulation in support of energy efficiency. "Energy efficiency" is defined as: measures to increase the productivity with which energy is used. To illustrate,
higher efficiency central air conditioners (CACs) can use anywhere up to fifty percent less electricity than that consumed by
the models that dominate sales across the nation. These more efficient models cost up to one-third more than models of standard
efficiency. Even though they pay for themselves through electricity savings, relatively few are currently sold without market interventions providing programmatic information or financial
incentives to "move the market" toward the higher efficiency
equipment. Additionally, several utilities operate "load control"
programs which provide rate credits to electricity customers in exchange for the right to cycle CACs off for brief periods to help meet
peak demands. These examples of energy efficiency measures more efficient CACs and CAC load control - are chosen because
growth in summer peak period demand is creating needs for expensive new electric generating capacity throughout the nation.
There are hundreds of other energy efficiency measures that can
affect the whole range of electricity usage during all periods of the
year.
While any form of energy can be used more or less efficiently,
this analysis focuses on electricity. One route in support of demand-side energy efficiency is the consideration and adoption of
minimum efficiency standards for equipment and appliances. This
is the "codes and standards" route. By 2001, almost all states. had
in place construction codes requiring minimum levels of energy
efficiency in new and substantially renovated buildings. In addition, there is a federal appliance and equipment standards pro* David Nichols is the Senior Research Director of the Energy Group and Director of Energy Efficiency Programs at the Tellus Institute in Boston, Massachusetts.
For more information about the Tellus Institute or this subject matter, please visit
the Tellus Institute Website at http://www.tellus.org.
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gram which has grown in scope over the past two decades. 1 Codes
and standards will not be treated further here; our focus is on
other approaches relating functionally to the ongoing regulation of
the electricity sector.
Beginning in the 1970s, some electric utilities experiencing
rapid load growth decided to develop programs to reduce customer
demand driving load growth. The process of assessing demandside savings measures and then implementing programs to cause
them to be used came to be known as demand-side management
(DSM).
With the regulatory and economic restructuring of the electricity industry that began in the mid 1990s, the capacity of industry regulators to promote energy efficiency has changed
materially - at least where restructuring has gone furthest.
In the late 1990s, restructuring of the electric industry began
to be widely implemented, with the objective of deregulating aspects of energy supply while providing for retail competition in energy supply. Restructuring is not uniform across the United
States. The federal government has passed no "restructuring law."
What the federal government has done is encourage and facilitate
the deregulation of aspects of retail electricity services. This has
been done largely through orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), beginning in the area of open access to
transmission lines with non-discriminatory pricing. Deregulation
of retail services is largely a state matter. About half of the states
have taken decisive steps in the direction of deregulation. They
are at widely varying stages of implementation, and their electricity market structures and rules vary. The rest of the states are
avoiding deregulation at this writing.
This review identifies regulatory access points relative to
DSM and energy efficiency that cross-cut the various differing restructuring actions (or lack thereof), while pointing out how crosscutting elements of regulatory roles vary depending on the local
situation. Though issues relating to federal action are identified,
much of the emphasis is on the state level. The "regulatory role"
encompasses both what regulators can or cannot do, and what
parties interested in promoting energy efficiency can do to shape
regulatory frameworks and actions. Four major categories of lever
1. Appliance Standards Awareness Project, http://www.standardsasap.org (last
visited Feb. 8, 2001). Cumulative estimated savings from federal standards totaled
88 billion kilowatt-hours by 2000, according to the Appliance Standards Awareness
Project.
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are addressed: planning, retail rate-making, environmental regulation, and funding.
II.

Planning

Planning for electricity can first be considered in terms of integrated resource planning (IRP), and then in terms of new planning paradigms suitable for deregulated environments. From the
late 1980s through the mid-1990s, strategic planning in the form
of IRP was adopted in most state jurisdictions.
A.

Integrated resource planning

IRP is a dynamic process that evaluates alternative mixes of
supply-side and demand-side resources according to specified criteria, including minimizing the total resource costs of providing
energy services. It has been most extensively applied to and practiced by vertically integrated, investor-owned utilities (IOUs), but
a number of public power systems (local and federal) have taken
an IRP approach as well.
The need for strategic electric resource planning is, of course,
driven by a number of economic and environmental objectives.
The point emphasized here is that IRP has been a major lever by
which DSM programs were developed and implemented, resulting
in documented and societally cost-effective savings through increased energy efficiency. Electric IRP regulations remain in several states that have not restructured, including Colorado,
Hawaii, Minnesota, Utah, and others. Other states that have not
restructured have allowed their IRP regulations and practice to
lapse, either by explicit policy or by regulatory neglect.
One lever for regulators and advocates aiming to strengthen
the regulatory contribution to energy efficiency is IRP. Where IRP
regulations have not lapsed, mobilization of multiple efficiency advocates may be required to secure serious attention to inclusion of
DSM resources in IRP. In a September 2000 IRP proceeding, the
Public Utilities Commission of Colorado approved a settlement
committing the State's largest IOU to securing a substantial peak
demand reduction (124,000 kilowatts) through energy efficiency
and load management programs.2 Funded at up to $75 million
over four years, this outcome was secured as a result of detailed
2. See generally DSM Win in Colorado,ENERGY PERSPECTIVES (Tellus Institute.,
Boston, Mass.), July 2000, at 8, available at http://www.tellus.org/energy/newsletters/
8lenper.pdf.
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evidence submitted by several public agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) intervening in the case. Where IRP
has lapsed, but the state has not restructured, regulators and advocates can work to restore the concept and practice of comprehensive IRP. The state can then use its processes to include costeffective energy efficiency resources in resource plans, and implement them through feasible programs. In addition, public utility
systems that retain the ability to own electric generation capacity
can continue to use IRP or can adopt IRP processes.
Up until the time of this writing, restructuring has focused on
the deregulation of electric generation investment and of the pricing of generated electricity. Thus, the distribution of electricity to
retail end users remains a regulated utility function. Regulated
utility investments in distribution plant and services, and in local
transmission, can and should be governed by IRP processes.
Least-cost transmission and distribution (T&D) planning can include significant demand-side and energy efficiency resources.
The policy challenge where generation has been restructured is to
create a distribution level planning framework. A model for this
3
sort of framework has been adopted in Vermont.
B.

Strategic energy assessment

Where restructuring has taken place, planning must be
reinvented. Where there has been a shift to competitive investment in and pricing of electric generation, and the concurrent demise of planning by integrated energy utilities and their
regulators, the need for a different kind of comprehensive planning for the electric sector has become apparent. What we need is
"strategic energy assessment."
The purpose of strategic energy assessment (SEA) for the
electric sector is not to select investments, as is the case with IRP.
Rather, its purposes are the traditional ones of state planning in
sectors such as transportation, water, and others. The importance
of energy in the economy of a region and its states, and the existence of numerous state policies regarding energy and the environment, make SEA a logical follow-up step to restructuring. SEA
is a form of comprehensive planning. New SEA processes can provide information to policymakers and stakeholders as to where
unfolding market forces are taking the power sector. From a tech3. See VT. DEP'T OF PUB. SERV., ENERGY EFFICIENCY PLAN, INTEGRATED RES.
PLANNING GUIDELINES (1997).
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nical viewpoint, SEA involves a scenario approach based on rigorous analysis of present and expected electric demands, by sector,
and of the supply sources that are likely to be available and forthcoming to meet those demands. A limited set of scenarios can be
used to reflect the major sources of uncertainty about future demand and supply. Like IRP, SEA includes, as one key element,
market assessment of the expected penetration of energy efficiency, and identification and economic assessment of the
amounts and types of energy efficiency unlikely to be realized
without new types of policy or regulatory interventions. SEA differs from traditional IRP in that it does not select the electric generation resource mix and investments. It does provide a
benchmark from which to assess needs for, and possible dimensions of, market interventions in such areas as public benefits
charges and portfolio standards, as discussed below. The political
challenge is to create state level SEA processes as well as regional
SEA processes based on such regions as New England and the
Mid-Atlantic (PJM Interconnection) area.
Transmission may provide a point of departure for efforts to
create SEA processes at technologically/economically useful regional levels. In its Order 2000, the FERC has directed the Independent System Operators (ISOs) that operate regional electric
systems to plan for transmission. 4 With no planning guidelines
having been set forth, the results are likely to be as skimpy as was
the inadequate planning for generation typical of IOUs in the decades before development of IRP. On the other hand, regional
SEAs would include economic and environmental assessment of
transmission investments as well as alternatives to them, like localized generation and energy efficiency. Comprehensive transmission assessment requires creation of an SEA process, parties
to which would work with ISOs, states, and the FERC. The SEA
entity may need to litigate at FERC in order to assure meaningful
planning. If non-transmission options are identified in tranmission SEAs, individual states could implement them through their
authority over distribution utilities and over facility siting.
III.

Rate Making

In price regulated systems, rates are set by regulators to afford the regulated utility an opportunity to recover its costs while
4. See generally FERC Regional Transmission Organizations, 18 C.F.R. pt. 35
(1999).
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earning a fair return on investment. They also reflect a variety of
other criteria such as fairness in reflecting costs of service among
different rate payers and promotion of economic efficiency. 5 Where
electric systems have not been "restructured," the cost of generation services are recovered through rates set by regulators, as are
the cost of other services such as T&D and metering and billing.
The rates of generation and other components can be designed so that their pricing structures reflect (or "signal") objectives of promoting energy efficiency and environmental protection.
The basic design tools are time of use (TOU) rates, which price
electricity higher during times of peak demand, and inclining
block rates, which increase the unit cost of electricity as the
amount of consumption increases. TOU and inclining block rates
can reflect the long term economic and environmental benefits of
efficiency in electricity use. 6 In most "unrestructured" jurisdictions, rates do not reflect these environmental and efficiency design objectives. In many of them, in fact, rates are still
"promotional," e.g., declining block rates during peak demand periods. There is an abundance of opportunities for regulators and
efficiency advocates to pay serious attention to rate structures
which in most cases are completely out of synchronization with
efficiency objectives.
Once restructuring has become effective, generation service is
available from third party electricity suppliers or from distribution utilities offering provider of last resort services of varying design. The non-generation services are still offered under
regulated rates. They often constitute more of the electricity customer's rates and bills than do generation services. Distribution
level rates seldom reflect environmental and efficiency design
objectives and are often promotional. Here too, then, there are
many opportunities to attend to rate structures that are out of
synchronization with efficiency objectives. In both restructured
and fully regulated jurisdiction, there has been increasing attention to innovative design of regulated rates. The innovations typically advocated and adopted cut against environmental and
efficiency objectives.
One innovation is increasing the customer charge component
of rates. Most rate designs include a fixed monthly charge simply
to receive electricity service. One trend is to shift additional cost
5. See, e.g., JAMES BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTIL. RATES (1961).
6. See JOHN STUTZ ET AL., REPORT TO THE NAT'L ASS'N OF REGULATORY UTIL.
COMM'RS, ALIGNING RATE DESIGN POLICIES WITH INTEGRATED RES. PLANNING (1993).
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recovery to these fixed charges, which consumers cannot affect by
using electricity wisely. There is no sound basis in economic or
regulatory theory for increasing customer charges, and efforts to
do so can be opposed by regulators.
Another rate-making innovation is multi-year rate-making
frameworks, which provide for adjustments to rates during the period between rate cases. Such frameworks are usually known as
performance based ratemaking (PBR) or alternative rate making.
Traditionally, rates are set during periodic rate cases and remain
unchanged from one rate case to the next. Thus, the utility has an
incentive to be efficient by cutting its operating costs below the
levels of operating expenses that were included when rates were
set, thus increasing earnings. PBR has the stated objective of creating stronger incentives for operational efficiency over time. PBR
schemes often increase the time period between full rate cases,
and always provide for rates to be readjusted within the interrate-case period on some basis intended to allow the utility to
profit from efficiency improvements. PBRs generally include provisions for adjustments for price inflation and a baseline level of
productivity improvement. Unfortunately, they also usually include a price cap mechanism, which sets maximum prices over the
entire PBR period, and allows the utility to retain some or all of
the profit generated if the costs of service can be kept below the
revenue generated at the price cap. Since greater sales volume increases revenue and helps keep unit costs below the rate cap, the
utility is incented to promote sales growth. Price caps constitute a
financial disincentive to the utility's promotion of energy efficiency. By contrast, revenue cap PBRs are based on the same general approach as price caps, but focus on controlling total energy
bills (revenue) rather than prices. Under a revenue cap, either
total revenue or revenue per customer is set over the entire PBR
period. The key difference between the revenue cap and the rate
cap is this: rate caps reward sales growth and productivity improvements, while revenue caps reward only productivity improvements. Increased sales cannot boost revenues above the
revenue cap. To help utilities promote efficiency, regulators can
avoid price caps and promote revenue caps in PBR.
Rate design has been severely neglected during the furor over
restructuring. Rate making is here to stay, and it is seriously
overdue for focused attention on the part of regulators and advocates who care about promoting efficiency in the consumption of
electricity.
7
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Environmental Regulation

Electricity generation has multiple and serious environmental impacts, all of which can be reduced through demand-side energy efficiency. Sulfur oxide (SO,) and nitrogen oxide (NO.) air
emissions are among pollutants of concern from a health standpoint. Emissions of carbon dioxide contribute to warming of the
global atmosphere and are the subject of national and international discussions about how to avert climate change. Electricity
generation requires both land for plant sites and water for cooling
systems. In addition, transmission lines require land. Any reduction in the amount of electricity supply over time will tend to reduce these unavoidable impacts of electricity supply.
A.

Air emissions

One way to limit undesirable air emissions is the "cap and
trade" approach. This approach is used in the 1990 U.S. Clean Air
Act amendments (CAAA) 7 to limit SO 2 emissions from power
plants and other sources. Under the CAAA, state-level cap and
trade systems are allowed. A number of state NO. caps have been
put into place, mainly in the Northeast United States. From an
environmental perspective, the key need is to set any emissions
cap low enough that the entire cap and trade system yields the air
pollution reductions desired by policy makers.
If savings from energy efficiency is included in a cap and
trade system in an integral way, then generation savings from
documented demand-side efficiency become an economically valuable way to comply with the caps. Of the several approaches to
integrating efficiency, the most direct is setting aside a number of
the allowances to emit the capped pollutant for allocation to savings from energy efficiency. This was done at the federal level
under the CAAA, but restrictions on qualifying energy efficiency
savings, combined with a low market price for SO 2 allowances, has
limited the use made of this set-aside program. States like New
Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts have included "set-asides"
for energy efficiency in their new NO, cap policies, but the portion
of allowances reserved for efficiency is only a few percent at best.
As states consider state or regional cap and trade systems, and if
Congress revisits the CAAA, efficiency advocates can work for
stronger integration of energy efficiency into environmental regulations. Set-asides must provide methods to measure and verify
7. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (1994).
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efficiency savings, as well as to aggregate savings from many
small electricity users.8 Clearly, efficiency advocates need to be
involved in the design details of new environmental regulatory
mechanisms.
B.

Facility siting

The need for any sizable electric generation facility has to be
established to the satisfaction of state regulators, though "certificate of need" provisions are typically weakened under electricity
restructuring. Nevertheless, all states have retained a substantial degree of review over the siting of electric generation facilities
within their jurisdictions. In addition to demonstrating compliance with applicable federal and state regulations, new facilities
must typically demonstrate some level of need (however vitiated),
exploration of alternatives, acceptable impacts on public health
and safety, adequate waste management plans, and minimization
of emissions and other environmental impacts. If siting regulations allow for investment in energy efficiency to offset environmental harms, energy efficiency can be "packaged" with a facility
and its accompanying mitigation measures. In order to be environmentally beneficial, energy efficiency must be incremental and
must offset environmental harms that remain after all feasible
supply-side mitigation is incorporated.
V. Funding for Efficiency
There are both direct and indirect methods to collect funds
from ratepayers to fund energy efficiency initiatives. Since direct
methods have received much attention, we begin first with a
promising indirect method, then turn to the more direct approach.
A.

Energy efficiency portfolio standards

The indirect method that regulators and efficiency advocates
might well consider is modeled on the renewable energy portfolio
standard (RPS). The RPS requires the regulated or unregulated
entity supplying generation services in a given jurisdiction to acquire specified minimum portions of its generation from qualifying renewable energy resources. Analogously, an energy efficiency
portfolio standard (EEPS) would require electricity suppliers to
8. See CATHERINE MORRIS & PAIGE SHELBY, CENTER FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY, RECOGNIZING EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES UNDER A CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM (1999).
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match a stated percentage of their electricity sold with documented, incremental demand-side resources.
An EEPS requires that retail suppliers of electricity cause energy savings equal to a stated percentage of the volumes of energy
they sell. For example, each electricity supplier might be required
to document that it induces demand-side energy conservation savings equal to one percent of its electricity sales each year. An
EEPS would require a minimum level of demand-side energy efficiency from each supplier, which it could provide through its own
competitive products or by partnering with other companies or entities. The portfolio standard would ensure that energy suppliers
do not neglect the efficiency market, but rather participate in it
and spur its development. If set in the same spirit as renewable
resource portfolio standards, an EEPS would result in a modest
increase in the amount of energy efficiency activity in a
jurisdiction.
Because it has defined requirements, an EEPS would create
an incentive for energy suppliers to sell energy-efficiency services
on a profitable basis to the extent possible, and to contribute the
least amount possible of their own funds to meet the requirements. An EEPS would encourage suppliers to find the lowest-cost
efficiency resources available to satisfy their required delivery
level. Texas' recently adopted requirement that utilities meet ten
percent of estimated load growth with energy efficiency is a simple
form of EEPS. 9
B.

Ratepayer Funding

In rough correlation with the momentum toward restructuring, ratepayer-funded utility investment in DSM nationwide began to decline from its peak of over $2.7 billion annually in 1993
and 1994, to half of that amount in 1998. It was only because of
the cumulative effect of DSM measures that the total estimated
reduction to utilities' peak demands in 1998, 45 billion kilowatts,
was the same as that in 1994.10 One of the major emphases of
efficiency advocates in restructuring jurisdictions has been creation of distribution level charges that would provide a steady reve9. See

Pus. UTIL. COMM'N OF TEX., SUBSTANTIVE

(2000).
10. See U.S. ENERGY INFO.

ADMIN.,

U.S.

RULES, ch. 25 Electric,

§ 25.181

ELECTRIC UTIL. DEMAND-SIDE MGMT.

tbl. 46 (1998). This includes public and
cooperative as well as investor-owned systems. Cumulative estimated energy savings
totaled 52.5 billion kwh.
PROGRAM ANNUAL AND INCREMENTAL EFFECTS,
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nue stream for publicly supported energy efficiency initiatives.
These charges go by a variety of names including system benefits
charge, societal benefits charge, and public benefits charge (PBC);
we use the last term here.
This policy area has been left to last because it has already
received wide attention. PBCs have been adopted in about half of
the restructuring jurisdictions as well some jurisdictions that
have not restructured. The level of PBCs varies greatly, from
small fractions of a mil on each kilowatt-hour (kwh) sold, to over 3
mils/kwh. Most are levied on distribution utility customers as volumetric (per kwh) charges, but one is levied as a customer charge.
The duration of PBCs varies as do the processes for considering
extensions of them in the future. 1 The mobilization of multiple
efficiency advocates has proven a prerequisite to establishing and
sustaining significant PBC funding levels for energy efficiency.
Most PBC charges were designed to continue the DSM funding level in effect (through rate cases or other regulatory proceedings) just before the PBC was established. But often they have
represented deliberate reductions from those levels. Either way,
PBC levels have been set without reference to the magnitude of
the untapped potential for demand-side efficiency gains. In the future, regulators and efficiency advocates may wish to link the
amount of revenues a PBC is designed to yield to the magnitude,
cost, and cost-effectiveness of untapped energy efficiency potential, as revealed through an SEA or IRP process.
Once a PBC is in effect, documentation of its costs and benefits is essential, especially in those jurisdictions where the legislature established the charge. Rigorous evaluation methods have
been developed and successfully applied which can isolate with
reasonable accuracy the energy savings produced by DSM programs. Drawing on these, Massachusetts has prepared documen12
tation of PBC results that can be considered a model report.
Proposals have been mooted in Washington, D.C. for a national PBC system. This system would be in the form of U.S. contributions matching state-initiated PBCs. At this writing, the
11. See DAVID NICHOLS ET AL., REPORT TO THE COLO. GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF ENERGY MGMT. AND CONSERVATION, FUNDING FOR ENERGY RELATED PUB. BENEFITS
(1999).
12. See COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND Bus. REGULATION, Div. OF ENERGY RES. REPORT: 1998 ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTIVITIES (2000); See
also COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND Bus. REGULATION,
Div. OF ENERGY RES. REPORT: 1999 ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTIVITIES (2001).
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National Regulatory Research Institute is completing a survey of
state-level funding of DSM through PBCs and other regulatory
measures such as rate case decisions. It is intended that the results will provide the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners with information they may use to consider options
and recommendations for a national PBC framework. Although
the PBC concept arose in the context of restructuring debates,
there is no necessary linkage between a PBC and deregulation.
Advocates active in national debates can delink consideration of
PBC options from restructuring issues, especially since rising
prices in restructured jurisdictions had, by 2001, thrown the entire electricity deregulation enterprise into disarray across the
nation.
If a PBC system is set up to generate revenue dedicated to
efficiency, there are different approaches to the application of
these monies. In many states utilities continue to administer and
implement DSM under regulatory oversight, but in others new approaches are being tried. New approaches include administration
by a state agency and administration by a third party administrator selected through competitive bidding. There are advantages
and disadvantages to each delivery approach. These are beyond
the scope of this paper, but one point is not: regulators and efficiency advocates need not conflate the issues of funding levels on
the one hand, and implementation approaches on the other. Common ground on the need for and appropriate level of funding is
logically anterior to the question of administration and
implementation.
VI.

Conclusion

The complexity of regulation of electricity is growing both
from the vantage point of business regulation and that of environmental regulation. The expertise and effort required of regulators
or advocates who would work for regulation that materially advances energy efficiency are now greater than ever before. This
paper describes four key sorts of regulatory policy and intervention which can have major effects on the pace and level of market
penetration of energy efficiency measures. These may be summarized as follows:
(1) Constitute and seriously apply planning frameworks that
integrate demand-side efficiency measures into the assessment of
overall strategic scenarios to meet electricity-relatedenergy serhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol18/iss2/4
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vice needs. Strategic energy assessment to provide benchmarks
for structuring and regulating new energy markets needs to be
created in restructured jurisdictions, while integrated resource
planning needs to be reinvigorated in the many jurisdictions
which, as is increasingly apparent, will not soon restructure.
(2) Review and overhaul rate-makingframeworks; redirectrate
design so thatprices signal the value to consumers and society of
efficiency in the consumption of electricity. Rates set by regula-

tors are here to stay, applying at least to the distribution level,
and in many jurisdictions to generation services as well. Inclining block rate structures and mandatory time of use rates can be
promoted. Equally important is opposition to efforts to establish price cap regulation or to increase fixed monthly charges
that are independent of electricity usage.
(3)

Integrate energy efficiency into environmental regulation.

Federal and state air emission regulations should incorporate
set asides of non-token numbers of emission allowances to be
awarded for emission reductions arising from energy efficiency
savings. Additionally, facility siting regulations should provide
for energy efficiency as a means of mitigating environmental
harms still remaining after strict environmental criteria have
been satisfied by a facility plan.
(4) Create direct or indirect public benefits funding mechanisms commensurate with the achievable potential for cost-effective energy efficiency in a given jurisdiction. Energy efficiency

portfolio standards are a promising and relatively untested approach. Loosely modeled on renewable resource portfolio standards, EEPS require each electricity supplier to induce energy
efficiency equivalent to a small portion of its electricity sales.
Direct funding, alone or in tandem with other policies, is already widely recognized as a potentially powerful lever for energy efficiency. Experience with PBCs has shown that the
mobilization of multiple efficiency advocates can create the political momentum to establish and sustain significant PBC funding levels for energy efficiency.
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